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   The settings and circumstances of internal investigations are as manifold as life itself. 
They are conducted according to the usual customs of the company and the legal tradi-
tion in its jurisdiction. Internal investigations differ depending on their scope and goals. 
A compliance audit examining whether local management adhered to internal rules and 
regulations and compliance processes is conducted differently compared to an investiga-
tion following a whistle-blower report. Internal investigations conducted in parallel 
with criminal investigations or those of supervisory authorities or aimed at supporting 
these investigations often follow other rules. Just as the particular circumstances of in-
ternal investigations can differ considerably, the legal issues raised by them can be equal-
ly varied and complex, in particular in group-wide cross-border investigations. All af-
fected companies and corporate bodies, holding companies and affiliates or even differ-
ent departments within one company, the management and supervisory boards of the 
companies, their shareholders, employees, business partners and other external players 
often have varied and conflicting interests which sometimes cannot easily be resolved 
and many of which are protected by applicable local laws. 
 
In the following I would like to address some typical areas in international internal in-
vestigations in which legal conflicts exist between holding companies and affiliates or 
within participating entities and functions: Some of these are often overlooked when 
defining the scope or methods of an internal investigation and its legal limits.   
I. CONFIDENTIALITY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
 
   Privacy and data protection issues are of major concern in any kind of compliance 
review, compliance audit and in particular in international internal investigations.1 Data 
might be transferred from one corporate body (affiliate) to another (holding company) 
and/or to different jurisdictions. Even regular or random controls by the internal audit 
or compliance department of the holding company can trigger similar complex privacy 
issues which need legal assessment under all applicable laws in all affected jurisdictions. 
Even if awareness of these issues exists within a group of companies, it often first has to 
be raised at foreign law enforcement agencies.2 Privacy issues can require the company to 
delete any reference to or redact personal data, in particular names, or other information 
which easily allows the identification of an individual.3 This can make it impossible to 			
1
  Tim Wybitul, chapter II note I, in Internal Investigations (Thomas C. Knierim et al eds., 2012); Thomas C. 
Knierim, chapter 5 note 140, in Handbuch des Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrechts (Heinz-Bernd Wabnitz & 
Thomas Janovsky, 4th ed. 2006). 
2
  Ralf Deutlmoser & Alexander Filip, European Data Privacy versus U.S. (e-)Discovery Obligations - A Practi-
cal Guide For Enterprises, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DATENSCHUTZ (ZD) (6/2012). 
3
  Tim Wybitul, Interne Ermittlungen auf Aufforderung von US-Behörden – ein Erfahrungsbericht, BETRIEBS- 
BERATER (BB) 606, 610 (12.2009); Stephan Spehl & Thomas Grützner, § 6 (Germany), in Corporate Internal 
Investigations note 159 (Spehl/Grützner, 2013). 
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provide documents or emails without redacting parts of them and requires the de-
personalisation of investigation reports. 
 
Apart from privacy laws, it is not always the case that the internal audit or compliance 
department or an external law firm or auditing firm which has been instructed to con-
duct an internal investigation can access information and data in possession of a compa-
ny which has not requested the audit. In almost all jurisdictions, the management of a 
company is duty-bound to protect its trade and business secrets. This is one of the duties 
of managers and employees arising from their employment contracts, the company’s 
articles of association, or statutory civil or criminal law provisions. This covers, amongst 
other things, details on contractual relations with customers and vendors, how a con-
tract was acquired, how the company has interacted with competitors and similar mat-
ters. Whether or not or to what extent a trade or business secret can be disclosed to other 
parties, even if they belong to the same group of companies, must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis. The laws of more than one jurisdiction may apply if the secrets of a 
company are available in branch offices or shared service centres situated in various 
countries. 
 
A secret can be disclosed if the party whose interest is to be protected by the confidenti-
ality obligation consents thereto. Whether the consent of the management is sufficient 
or whether the consent of the supervisory board or the shareholders is also required, 
must be determined on the basis of applicable national law. The same applies to the 
question of which requirements relating to form and other prerequisites must be met. 
 
Confidentiality clauses in contracts can oblige a contractual party to keep all infor-
mation related to that contract confidential even with respect to holding companies. 
Controls by holding companies or vague compliance requirements do not nullify such 
confidentiality obligations. Although the holding company may feel that it has a legiti-
mate interest in obtaining such information, the affiliate’s obligation under applicable 
law may be different. Non-compliance with contractual confidentiality obligations 
normally results in a breach of contract and places the breaching party at risk of the oth-
er contractual party asserting its right to obtain a remedy, in particular to termination 
and/or damages. Additionally, it must be taken into account that results obtained in an 
internal investigation by violation of such confidentiality obligations may not be used 
against the other contractual party. 
In certain cases, the breach of confidentiality obligations can also constitute a criminal 
offence. If the offence is designed to protect business secrets of the company from un-
lawful disclosure by management or employees, the consent of the competent body of 
the company will eliminate criminal risk. However, if the contractual party is a govern-
mental or semi-governmental entity or company, statutory confidentiality regulations in 
that party’s jurisdiction may apply. This may in particular apply if business or contracts 
with national security authorities, secret services or their procurement entities are con-
cerned. Applicable law may provide that even the granting of access to employees of a 
contractual party requires prior notification and/or the consent of the other contractual 
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party, and even more if access is to be granted to employees of outside parties. A viola-
tion of these statutory confidentiality rules may entail criminal law risks. Both the 
breaching party, its directors or officers as well as all individuals who were unlawfully 
given access to the information may be at risk of having committed espionage or related 
crimes. The result in such cases can be, for example, that a document or email search in 
an internal investigation on alleged bribery requires the prior consent of the bribed par-
ty. Similarly, Articles 271 and 273 of the Swiss Criminal Code prohibit the gathering of 
evidence or collection of business secrets which will or might be used in proceedings or 
litigation in foreign countries and, thus, limits the potential use of information gathered 
or revealed in the course of internal investigations on Swiss soil.4 
II. IN-HOUSE LEGAL PRIVILEGE 
 
Legal privilege issues are usually discussed with respect to the protection of privileged 
information from disclosure to law enforcement agencies and prosecutors. Similar prob-
lems arise in internal investigation situations with respect to the disclosure of infor-
mation to the compliance department or the internal investigators, at least for those 
jurisdictions which acknowledge legal privilege with respect to advice given by in-house 
counsel.5 Depending on whether legal privilege is a right of members of the legal profes-
sion, as in the Netherlands, or a right of the client, the client’s consent to disclosure to 
the internal investigators may be required. This leads to the question of who the client 
is, irrespective of whether advice was given by in-house counsel or external counsel. The 
company or also the manager concerned? 
 
Example:  
The managing director of a Romanian affiliate of a Japanese company approaches the 
regional legal department on what steps he, as a managing director, must take after be-
coming aware of rumours that the sales department may have used a dubious consultant 
for the acquisition of a contract. 
 
In such contexts it cannot easily be said that the managing director did not act in a per-
sonal capacity, but as a function holder of the affiliate. In many situations it is difficult 
to determine whether the instructions were (solely) aimed at obtaining advice on what 
the legal obligations of the company are, but (additionally) what he in his capacity as 			
4
  Mark Livschitz, § 12 (Switzerland), in Corporate Internal Investigations note 21 et seq (Spehl/Gruetzner, 
2013). 
5
  Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler, The production of documents in international arbitration - a commentary on 
article 3 of the new IBA Rules of Evidence, ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 411 (2002); Gabrielle Kauf-
mann-Kohler & Antonio Bärtsch, Discovery in international arbitration: How much is too much? ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR SCHIEDSVERFAHREN (SCHIEDSVZ) 13, 19 f. (2004). 
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function holder is required to do. The answer to this question determines whether ac-
cess to that information requires the consent of the manager concerned as well. This 
could be difficult if he or she is or may become a suspect in the investigation or has al-
ready left or been dismissed from the company. Similar questions arise regarding the 
scope of protected information, in particular if the consent of employees providing 
information to in-house counsel for giving advice to the client is also required. 
III. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
 
In many cases, the results of the internal investigations will be used to meet mandatory 
requirements under applicable law, to immediately stop any illegal activities, to attempt 
remediation if deficiencies or weaknesses in processes and controls are discovered or to 
take appropriate employment measures up to the dismissal of the individuals involved. 
Companies usually have broad discretion to disclose the findings of internal investiga-
tions to law enforcement agencies. This depends mostly on the corporate culture of the 
company, legal traditions in the jurisdictions affected and whether a zero tolerance poli-
cy is interpreted in such a way that all violations of criminal law or particular violations 
will be disclosed to prosecutors or other law enforcement agencies. 
 
Certain jurisdictions do have leniency programmes principal witness arrangements) in 
place or provide for principal witness arrangements (like Section 209b Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure) if an offence is disclosed voluntarily or the disclosing party is the 
first to inform law enforcement agencies about criminal conduct and makes a significant 
contribution to the full disclosure and investigation of the notified conduct. Such leni-
ency programmes can lead to a reduction in fines. For example, Article 16 of the Brazili-
an Law 12,846 (Clean Companies Act) establishes that upon participation in a leniency 
programme, corporate fines will be reduced by two-thirds. Other jurisdictions provide 
for exemption from criminal prosecution, e.g. Articles 290 (3) and 292 (2) of the Crimi-
nal Code of Romania or Sections 371, 398a and 378 (3) of the Fiscal Code of Germany. 
Companies have wide discretion on whether to make use of these leniency possibilities 
or to refrain from doing so.6 In many jurisdictions there is a lack of experience regarding 
whether these provisions have been applied at all or how they will be applied in practice. 
 
In other jurisdictions there are compulsory notification requirements, either in general 
or in particular situations. Most jurisdictions provide for mandatory notification of 
certain forthcoming infringements of law, mainly serious offences. Some of them are 
connected to health and safety violations, violations of technical safety requirements or 			
6
  Gerald Spindler, AktG, section 93, in Münchener Kommentar note 54 (Wulf Goette et al eds., 3rd ed. 2008); 
Christian Pelz, Offenbarungs- und Meldepflichten bei Internal Investigations, in Festschrift für Jürgen Wes-
sing 614 (Heiko Ahlbrecht et al eds., 1st ed. 2016). 
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environmental hazards. For example, this applies to Chapter 15 Section 10 of the Finnish 
Criminal Code. Disclosure requirements may result if the internal investigation reveals 
that unsafe or dangerous products have been distributed or sold which may require a 
product warning or a recall. 
 
Certain jurisdictions also impose an obligation to notify law enforcement agencies of 
criminal conduct committed in the past. For example, Article 108 of the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code of the People’s Republic of China obliges every organisation and individu-
al to notify law enforcement agencies if a crime is suspected. Comparably, under Arti-
cle 77 of the Law 906/2004 of Columbia, anyone who has knowledge of a past offence 
must file a notification. In both countries, the duty to inform law enforcement agencies 
is a general civic duty. A violation of such duty does not, however, incur criminal liabil-
ity. 
 
The duty of legality is a major pillar of all compliance systems worldwide, requiring the 
company, its managers and employees to abide by the rules of law, at home and abroad. 
In particular, managers can become liable for damages if they do not ensure that the 
company complies with all applicable domestic and foreign law.7 Taking compliance 
seriously and in a strict dogmatic manner, the company has to notify the law enforce-
ment agencies of such criminal conduct; otherwise it will be difficult to explain to their 
employees that the company expects full compliance with the law from its employees, 
but itself supports cherry-picking and decides on a case-by-case basis whether it is ap-
propriate to meet legal requirements. 
 
It can be argued that non-compliance with these laws does not impose a legal risk on the 
company and flouting the law may only cause reputational but not financial harm. Alt-
hough this is true from a commercial perspective, such convenient decisions undermine 
the acceptance and notion of compliance as a whole. 
 
It becomes much more difficult to resolve these conflicts if non-compliance can be en-
forced by sanctions. Sometimes sanctions are minimal, such as those in Art. 274 Crimi-
nal Code of the United Arab Emirates, under which non-notification of a crime can be 
penalised with a fine of up to 1,000 dirhams (equivalent to approximately EUR 240 or 
USD 250). From a financial perspective there will be room to weigh up the commercial 
interests of the company with the consequences of non-compliance. However, other 
jurisdictions provide for severe criminal sanctions including imprisonment for violation 
of notification requirements. For example Sec. 316 (1) Crime Act 1900 of New South 
Wales, Sec. 34 Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act of South Africa or 			
7
  Regional Court Munich 10.12.2013 - 5 HK O 1387/10, NZWiSt 2013, 183, 187; Christian Pelz, We observe local 
law – Strafrechtskonflikte in internationalen Compliance-Programmen, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEIT-
SCHRIFT (CCZ) 234, 237 (2013). 
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Art. 441 of Law 599/2000 of Colombia provide for fines and/or imprisonment if past 
criminal conduct is not disclosed to the relevant law enforcement agencies. Whilst these 
criminal law provisions require both intent and proof that a crime was committed, in-
ternal investigations often cannot furnish full proof of a criminal offence but only a 
more or less high degree of suspicion, so that – from a pragmatic perspective – there may 
be some room left for argumentation. However, the law can be different in other juris-
dictions. Article 368 of the Czech Criminal Code or Article 340 of the Criminal Code of 
Slovakia, for example, provide that each individual is obliged to notify law enforcement 
agencies about the mere suspicion of certain criminal conduct, such as bribery offences. 
Such obligation is imposed on any person within the reach of the applicable law. In 
jurisdictions which acknowledge criminal liability of companies, the obligation is im-
posed on companies as well. In addition to this, each natural person within the scope of 
application of that law is obliged to meet the notification requirements. This may apply 
to board members of the relevant company, future board members, or every employee 
residing in the territory where the relevant act took place who learns about such suspi-
cion. Notwithstanding this, the internal investigators, once they learn or have 
knowledge of such suspicion and are residing in the territory of such jurisdiction, even 
temporarily, are also required to make such notification. 
 
If lawyers or accountants act as internal investigators, conflicts between such notifica-
tion requirements and the obligation to protect attorney-client privilege may result. 
Whilst most countries acknowledge attorney-client privilege, it needs to be determined 
whether such privilege applies only to attorneys and accountants admitted to the local 
bar or if it is also granted to foreign lawyers and accountants. In most jurisdictions, at-
torneys and accountants admitted in one EU Member State can request admission in 
another Member State for certain activities or proceedings and then enjoy the same pro-
tection as local attorneys. However, this may not apply to internal investigations, but 
only to legal proceedings. Further, it is questionable whether suspicion obtained by 
investigating books and records of a company is protected by attorney-client privilege, in 
particular if the lawyer or accountant has not received such information from or on 
behalf of their client. 
 
This problem becomes more complex if the violation of professional secrecy obligations 
also constitutes a criminal offence under the laws of the country in which the internals 
investigator are admitted or practise. The professionals concerned then have a problem: 
they will be criminally liable under the laws of the country in which they were admitted 
to practise if they disclose information or would do so under the laws of where the in-
vestigation is taking place if they refrain from disclosing it. The only option this leaves 
these professionals is to decide which offence they would prefer to commit. It might be 
a defence argument that a person cannot be held criminally liable if either reaction 
would lead to the violation of criminal law. Whether or not such a defence would be 
acknowledged is a question of applicable national jurisdiction. There are virtually no 
court precedents and uncertainty will therefore remain. It would be unjust to rule out 
this defence due to the fact that professionals in an internal investigation voluntarily put 
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themselves in a situation in which they had to notify the authorities and that by accept-
ing such a mandate remit, the notification requirement prevails. Investigators who are 
not bound by professional secrecy cannot even rely on this defence but have no other 
option from a legal point of view but to meet the disclosure requirements.  
 
In my experience, internal investigators in such situations will most likely refrain from 
complying with the notification requirement and accept that they will commit a crimi-
nal offence (provided they even know about their notification requirements). This is 
driven by a pragmatic approach: The internal investigators will most likely be admitted 
and practise in a foreign jurisdiction and will only be temporarily subject to the scope of 
application of these criminal law provisions on notification for a considerably short 
period of time, thus considerably reducing the actual risk of prosecution. 
IV. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE OF INVESTIGATORS 
 
Usually when conducting an internal investigation, companies try to protect attorney-
client privilege and attorney-work privilege as best as possible. In international internal 
investigations it is a must to determine the prerequisites and scope of attorney-client 
privilege in all affected jurisdictions before starting work. One must not forget to ana-
lyse this question from all aspects. Whilst information gathered by the internal investi-
gator usually falls within the scope of attorney-client privilege, it must be assessed in 
which direction the scope provides protection. Usually, only the client is protected by 
the privilege which leads to the next question of who the client is. Accepting multiple 
instructions from more than one company of a group of companies is risky since each 
client might waive privilege separately so that remaining clients might no longer be pro-
tected against disclosure of information which is not only theirs. Often it will be diffi-
cult to determine who the owner of a secret is so that, in cases of doubt, the consent of 
all owners may be required. Further, if members of the compliance or internal audit 
department form part of the investigation team, knowledge which they obtain during 
the internal investigation is not protected since they are not acting in the capacity of 
attorneys or accountants, but within the scope of their usual work duties. To obtain full 
protection they may not form part of the investigation team and not obtain additional 
knowledge which they do not already have. 
 
In international investigations it always is necessary to obtain local counsel for the as-
sessment of factual questions or legal analysis. The scope of attorney-client privilege of 
local counsel is determined by applicable local law. In certain jurisdictions, China for 
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example, attorney-client privilege does not explicitly exist at all8 or the scope of such 
privilege is extremely unclear. Other jurisdictions provide for attorney-client privilege 
only for certain members of the legal profession. In the Ukraine, for example, attorneys 
working for foreign law firms, rather than Ukrainian law firms, are exempt from the 
privilege of professional secrecy. In Russia, for example, only trial attorneys admitted as 
“advocats”, are protected by professional secrecy9 whilst client-attorney communication 
with regular attorneys is not protected at all. This must be taken into account when 
defining the scope of work of local counsel because even within one law firm, commu-
nication with one attorney may be privileged whilst it is not with another. 
V. MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
Anti-money laundering legislation in many jurisdictions requires obliged entities and 
natural persons to report suspicious transactions. Article 23 (2) of the Third Anti-
Money Laundering Directive10 and Article 34 (2) of the upcoming Fourth EU Anti-
Money Laundering Directive11, which must be transposed into the law of the Member 
States no later than 26 June 2017, provides that members of the legal profession and 
auditors may not disclose such information which they receive from, or obtain on, one 
of their clients, in the course of ascertaining the legal position of their client, or perform-
ing their task of defending or representing that client in, or concerning, judicial proceed-
ings, including providing advice on instituting or avoiding such proceedings, whether 
such information is received or obtained before, during or after such proceedings. Oth-
erwise, pursuant to Art. 22 (1) (a) of the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive, re-
porting obligations exist if the obliged entity knows or has reasonable grounds to sus-
pect that money laundering or terrorist financing is being or has been committed or 
attempted. 
 
The reporting obligation applies not only to present and future financial transactions, 
but it also encompasses cases in which the obliged entity subsequently obtains 
knowledge of facts indicating that a transaction was or could have been related to money 
laundering. Whilst members of the legal profession and accountants are exempted from 
the reporting obligation due to the fact that conducting an internal investigation will be 
regarded as “ascertaining the legal position for their client”, reporting obligations con-
tinue to apply to other persons. This may lead to the result that the investigated compa-			
8
  Michelle Gon & Ping Zheng, § 3 (China), in Corporate Internal Investigations, note 68 (Spehl/Gruetzner 
2013); Benjamin Miao/Peter Yuen/Melody Wang, chapter 7 (China), in The International Investigations Re-
view, 104 (Nicolas Bourtin, 3rd ed. 2013). 
9
  Ekaterina Kobrin, § 10 (Russia), in Corporate Internal Investigations, note 111 (Spehl/Gruetzner 2013). 
10
  Directive 2005/60/EC of 26 October 2005, Official Journal L 309/15. 
11
  Directive (EU) 2014/849 of 20 May 2015, Official Journal L 141/73. 
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ny or people participating in the investigation team without being a member of the legal 
profession are obliged to file a suspicious transaction report to the competent FIU. Ap-
plicable national law determines the details of the reporting obligation, in particular 
whether a strong suspicion of money laundering is required or a vague suspicion is suffi-
cient. 
 
Apart from submitting a suspicious transaction report, it must also be determined 
whether and to what extent criminal activity for the benefit of a corporate body or ac-
cording to which a corporate body is enriched will taint assets of such company. 
 
Example:   
The Romanian entity R of a Japanese holding company obtained contracts with customer 
C by corrupt means. C pays the purchase price of €1 million to the accounts of R, which 
then show a balance of €6 million. 
 
Will all payments received by R from C be regarded as the proceeds of a crime? Will a 
dividend payment of R to the holding company be made with tainted assets? Will the 
shares in the affiliate be regarded as the proceeds of a crime? 
 
If assets are tainted, it must be determined whether this will lead to a contamination of 
the assets in full or only in part. In our example, will the transfer of the purchase price 
taint the whole bank account of C or just the relevant portion?12 In the latter case, if C 
makes a payment of €2 million, will the whole sum be regarded as partially tainted or 
will it be considered untainted as long as the amount remaining in the bank account is 
higher than the funds of criminal origin? The answer to these questions will vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Depending on the answers to these questions, it must be 
determined whether each and every transfer and re-transfer will be considered money 
laundering and whether remedies exist (and if so, which ones) to avoid the contamina-
tion of subsequent transactions. 
VI. AMBIGUITY IN COMPANY INTEREST 
 
Whether an internal investigation is conducted and how to respond to investigation 
results are always important decisions. It is unanimously agreed that to immediately 
stop any illegal activity and to ensure adherence to law in the future is of utmost im-
portance. A differentiated approach is necessary when determining whether prosecutors 
and law enforcement agencies should be contacted. If self-reporting leads to immunity 			
12
  The German Federal Supreme Court in its decision of 20.05.2015 - 1 StR 33/15, NJW 2015, 3254 held that a 
“considerable portion” of illegal funds will taint the whole account. The court did not elaborate on what 
“considerable” exactly means but states that a portion of more than 5.9 % is considerable. 
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from prosecution or sanctions, the decision would appear relatively easy. However, it 
has to be taken into account that in many cases immunity from prosecution only means 
that the company cannot be fined. Damage claims against the company from customers 
or third parties will still be possible. The same might apply to disgorgement of profits. If 
self-reporting only leads to a reduction in fines it must carefully be determined whether 
such voluntary disclosure will pay off. In many cases this is difficult to decide. It might 
be the case that the costs of the investigation are much higher than the expected reduc-
tion of fines. A different approach might be necessary in countries like the US, which 
has a tendency to impose excessive fines. These risks as well as reputational risks, the 
likelihood of being otherwise disclosed or the time period until the matter becomes 
statute-barred have to be assessed. In international cases, limitation periods in many 
countries are much longer than in others. There is also a risk of double punishment in 
two jurisdictions. Under Section 54 Schengen Convention the ne bis in idem principle 
applies only between EU Member States.13 Even then, risks remain. It is first necessary 
for the other EU Member State to acknowledge this principle in the same way the other 
does. Secondly, protection can only be obtained for the same criminal conduct. This 
does not apply if one country does not prosecute due to limitation reasons or for of-
fences which exist only in one jurisdiction but not in the other. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Conducting an internal investigation always requires a careful and thorough assessment 
of all legal consequences which may arise from the findings. This in turn requires the 
investigator to analyse possible investigation results in all directions beforehand. Some-
times conflicts between jurisdictions cannot be completely avoided, but in many cases 
their consequences can. Proactive considerations at the beginning of an investigation are 
an asset which cannot be appreciated highly enough. It should be the task of the compli-
ance organisation of a company to make itself familiar with potential consequences of 
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